epidemic, soon after the mode of transmission had been reasonably well defined, so as to contain and reduce the likelihood of spread within the high-risk populations. The more recent, third public health failure has clearly been the current inability to organize an effective national public health program to prevent transmission of HIV to other high-risk groups. The rapid spread of infection into the drug-abuse population is the clear example of the public health failures. It is hoped that the fourth public health failure will not be the further spread of HIV into lower-risk heterosexual populations.
We noted in our previous paper that the failure of public health measures to control the epidemic was not due to the quality of the official public health services at both the federal and state levels, but rather to the lack of available resources and the substantial social and political restrictions placed on public health officials in their attempts to control the epidemic.
The primary goal of public health for controlling the AIDS epidemic must be the reduction of new infection with HIV. Any public health program must be based on some estimate of the prevalence of infection in the community, the size of the population at risk, and the type of behaviors likely to result in transmission of HIV. At least three risk groups can be described.
1. High-risk but uninfected individuals, such as drug abusers and homosexual men living in high-prevalence communities 2. Lower-risk but very susceptible groups such as the heterosexual contacts of intravenous (IV) drug abusers in high-prevalence communities, homosexuals, and IV drug abusers in lower-prevalence communities 3. Heterosexuals outside the very high-risk communities: Epidemics will occur either because of introduction and spread of the virus by IV drug abuse or through heterosexual contacts of bisexual men.
Control of the epidemic requires a decrease in the transmission of HIV in the population. Protection of the uninfected at-risk population must therefore be the highest priority.
Most individuals capable of transmitting HIV infection can be identified by specific serological blood tests. Recently, there has been considerable concern about the relatively long period of time before seroconversion of infected individuals and the probability that during this time they are capable of transmitting the disease to other individuals [2] . Clearly, no serological test is going to be perfect. The absence of antibodies or antigen in the blood is not definitive proof that an individual will not transmit the virus. It is likely, however, that most individuals capable of transmitting infection can be identified by having a positive antibody test verified by seroimmunological methods.
The modes of transmission of the virus are well defined [3] . Very few infections occur outside the high-risk groups. There is no evidence, at the present time, that transmission of HIV is occurring or will occur in the vast majority of individuals in the United States belonging to lower-risk categories. The majority of the at-risk but uninfected population can be identified as the spouses and other heterosexual contacts of IV drug abusers, uninfected IV drug abusers, uninfected homosexuals, spouses of hemophiliac men, and the offspring of infected women.
The behavioral changes required to reduce substantially the risk of infection can also be reasonably well described. All the tools necessary for control of this epidemic exist now and have existed in the past. Implementation of an effective public health program should be the major concern. Several steps are required in order to control the epidemic.
First is the need for good management. Another approach to surveillance has been utilized by Winkelstein and others in San Francisco in which they have sampled from a high-risk defined population [6] . Surveillance of AIDS cases is clearly no substitute for the measurement of incidence and prevalence of HIV in a community. The prevalence of infection in a community will provide important information with regard to the subsequent screening and educational programs. The incidence of infection is the best measure of the successes or failures of our educational prevention programs.
There is much to gain for those individuals who are infected in terms of these surveillance projects. Only through careful observation of infected asymptomatic and symptomatic individuals can the specific factors that result in AIDS and the potential for intervention to reduce the risks of developing AIDS be identified [5] . The argument that individuals who are infected gain nothing by participating in either screening or surveillance is fallacious.
The third component is education, which must be primarily oriented to high-risk individuals. The number one priority for educational programs must be individuals who are already infected, since obviously it is these individuals who alone will perpetuate the epidemic. These educational programs must be of two types. First, we must modify or eliminate those behaviors which result in the transmission of the virus. It is hard to believe that there are not enough funds provided in New York City and other communities adequately to staff drug-abuse treatment programs or enough case workers to provide education within a community in which the prevalence of infection is so extraordinarily high and the risks of transmission to the heterosexual population a reality.
The second component of education is to reduce the possibility of transmission, given that a specific risk behavior is still practiced. The use of condoms, sterile needles, various solutions that may result in partial sterilization of needles, and so on are examples of specific educational opportunities. Training of individuals to work in the high-risk populations should be a top priority. Until we can demonstrate that the incidence of new infection is declining in a specific community in relation to our educational program, we must presume that the educational effort has not been successful and that more resources will be required.
Education of the low-risk, vast majority of the public about the risk of HIV is probably of little value. The prevention of drug abuse is clearly a worthwhile educational goal, whether or not there was a HIV epidemic in the IV drug abuse population. Emphasis in educational programs with regard to specific sexual behaviors may be of relatively little value. It is probably unlikely that such educational messages reach either the infected individual or the high-risk populations, or that such groups are not already aware of the problems associated with specific sexual behaviors and the risks of infection. The HIV epidemic is not going to be resolved by the elimination of premarital sex or major educational programs to reduce the number of sexual partners among the vast numbers of low-risk individuals in the United States.
The fourth required step is the development of a screening program. A screening program must be limited only to high-risk populations; it must also be combined with the educational program. The basic goal of a screening program is primarily to identify infected individuals likely to transmit the disease. The success of any screening program will clearly depend on the prevalence of infection in the community. If 60-70 percent of the individuals in a specific community are infected, then screening programs are going to be of little value, since it would be more logical to presume that all individuals in the high-risk population are infected. On the other hand, in many communities where the rates of infection may only be as high as 20 or 30 percent, the identification of infected individuals and a major educational effort oriented to them may have substantial benefit. The primary reason for the screening effort is to focus the educational programs on the highest-risk infected individuals. If there were unlimited resources for the educational programs, then one might reasonably argue that screening to identify HIV-infected individuals might be of limited value, since it could only serve as a further educational tool to change behavior. We do not, however, have unlimited resources for our educational program, and, therefore, much of our effort must be oriented to individuals likely to transmit the disease. The major educational activity now, for the general public, is to change their attitude, to be able to point out to them that the epidemic remains confined to a relatively small cohort which can be identified, and that the specific modes of transmission are well defined.
Screening should be an active process in the community; that is, it should reach out into the high-risk community, along with the educational efforts. It should not be punitive in the sense that those individuals who are identified as being infected must not lose rights unrelated to the risk of transmission of the virus.
In most situations, screening should be voluntary. The ability to increase the percentage of high-risk individuals who are screened should be one of the measures of a successful health education program. There are situations, however, where screening should be mandatory because of the grave risk to the population. The risk of heterosexual transmission by IV drug abuse is so high, with the further potential of infecting newborns, that there may be a strong rationale to test all identified IV drug abusers. Vigorous education and treatment would be provided for those screened positive, with follow-up of their heterosexual contacts. There may be justification for testing all prisoners because of the potential for infection of other prisoners. The military service currently tests all new recruits; this precaution is probably justified on the basis of potential risks.
Screening of pregnant women may become important if methods become available to prevent transmission in utero. Such mandatory screening would then be justified to protect the newborn.
There also may be strong indications for testing in sexual disease clinics. The populations of these clinics are at high risk. Again, the goal would be education and potential treatment to both prevent transmission of HIV and AIDS disease. Mandatory as well as voluntary testing should not be performed in the absence of a combination of education and follow-up programs.
It is important to relegate to the farthest-back burner the often noted fear that individuals at risk will hide in order to avoid being tested. We seem to have remarkably little respect for some basic intelligence among those possibly infected with HIV or for the large number of individuals trained in behavioral sciences and health education who are supposed to possess the skills necessary to overcome these fears of screening.
One of the key unanswered questions is how to deal with infected individuals who are non-responsive to the educational efforts. How do we deal with an infected IV drug abuser with frequent heterosexual partners, infecting women in the community? If these women are of childbearing age, then there is the increased likelihood of infecting newborns. Should this individual be considered such a danger to society that he should be isolated or quarantined from the at-risk population?
One of the key arguments noted against screening is that the individual identified as infected has nothing to gain because there is no treatment. This argument makes little sense. The only way that we will understand the specific links between infection and disease is by observing and carefully following those individuals who are infected and testing various methods to prevent the development of AIDS. Therefore, individuals who are infected gain potentially the greatest benefit by being carefully monitored; their only hope of avoiding death due to AIDS is identification of some method to prevent the progression from infection to disease.
It is important, on the other hand, to protect the rights of the infected individual against the unwarranted intrusion of society, at least within the context of the risk of HIV transmission. The issue of confidentiality is constantly used to delay the implementation of effective screening, surveillance, and educational programs. One of the unfortunate problems that may be occurring is that the issue of confidentiality may increase the public's concern about the epidemic and lead to such hysteria that restrictions on behavior and life styles will be placed on the entire high-risk population, on every homosexual or every IV drug abuser, on the presumption that they are infected and capable of transmitting the virus unless proven otherwise. One could carry this attitude even further; a CDC study tried to estimate the size of the at-risk homosexual population in New York by counting all men over 15 or so in New York who were unmarried as "at-risk of being homosexual" until proven otherwise [7] . Worse, we may reach a situation where every young Hispanic male in New York is considered an IV drug abuser and infected, until proven otherwise, and will, therefore, not be hired for a job or allowed to participate in certain social, educational, and recreational activities.
Another concern about screening is the number of false positives that may be identified by the initial ELISA test [8] . The number of false positives is a function of the prevalence of infection in the community. Screening programs should only be oriented to high-risk populations, not the general public. Testing as a requirement for marriage licenses, hospital admissions, and so on is not of value. All positives should clearly be further evaluated with more sensitive and specific tests. The false-positive rate will be extremely high when testing is done in low-risk populations. A further concern about testing is, as noted, the false sense of security given to individuals who may be HIV-negative, but yet at high risk. Individuals defined as high-risk must be educated about the possibility that they are infected, that they have not yet become antibody-positive, and that they still have a risk of becoming infected even if their sexual or IV drug abuse behaviors are limited to individuals who are also HIVnegative, unless the partners have no historical evidence of being exposed to any of the high-risk behaviors.
There are, as was stated at the beginning of this paper, no clinical trials to evaluate the efficacy of screening combined with education. It is doubtful whether we can spend years designing and implementing clinical trials to evaluate screening and education. The primary function of screening should be to identify the infected individuals so that the limited resources for education and follow-up can be used for this high-risk population.
An infected individual must retain all rights that are not specifically related to risk of transmission of the virus or the likelihood of developing clinical disease based on the best current scientific knowledge. Infected individuals do not have a right to infect others by blood transfusion or blood products, heterosexual or homosexual relations, or by injection. They do have the right to work in most situations, to go to school, not to be identified as infected, except perhaps to those specifically at risk of becoming infected by them. It is important that public health officials balance the rights of the infected individual with those of the uninfected who wish to remain that way.
The decision as to any restriction of activities of the infected individuals must be made by public health officials and documented as to the reason for specific restriction, not as part of the perception of risk by individuals who do not understand the mode of transmission of the virus.
The American Medical Association [9] , as well as other health groups [10,1 1], has recently supported at least some level of screening along with education. They remained concerned about the protection of individual privacy and the risk that HIV-positive individuals will be ostracized from society. Public health officials must overcome this problem by vigorously supporting legislation and social policy that will protect the rights of the infected individual.
The HIV epidemic in the United States has raised three important and unanswered questions about the implementation of public health programs. The first is the balance between the individual's rights and the protection of the at-risk community. HIV infection results in a fatal disease. Does an individual known to be infected have the right to practice behaviors which will probably infect and kill other individuals? Do individuals who are known to be at high risk have the right to refuse testing and subsequent educational efforts because it may infringe on their individual freedoms? The American Medical Association now believes that a physician probably has the responsibility to notify the spouse of a HIV-infected heterosexual individual but remains concerned about the legal ramifications of a breach of confidentiality [9] . If we believe that the spouse of a heterosexual infected individual should be advised, then why not the partner of a homosexual infected individual? If we are to notify the sexual partners of both heterosexual and homosexual individuals, should we then also be responsible for notifying those individuals who share needles with an infected drug addict? If we did not know who was infected, such problems would not be relevant, and the epidemic could continue to run its rapid course within the community.
The second issue relates to the responsibility for the management and control of epidemics and the proper role of federal, state, and local agencies. The current AIDS epidemic emphasizes the need for a strong federal public health agency. On the other hand, there are unique regional situations which may be better served at the state or local level. The epidemic should make us review carefully both the size and the quality of available public health resources at the federal, state, and local levels, as well as the ability to implement these resources in times of major epidemics.
Last and perhaps most important is the role of public health officials and their ability to act independent of the usual political processes. One of the major problems in dealing with the HIV epidemic and the AIDS cases is the continued politicization of health education and the public health efforts to control the epidemic [12] . In the United States, we no longer have a strong, independent Public Health Service. The Surgeon General of the United States has, perhaps, acted more forcefully than any federal official in this epidemic, but his powers are extremely limited [13] .
The continued efforts by elected officials to decide on the proper educational format and programs based on a desire to satisfy their constituencies rather than on the need to control the epidemic raise serious questions about the ability to control both current and future epidemics in the United States [ 14] . Would it be more rational to consider a reorganization of public health activities in the United States, so that a semiindependent Public Health Service, headed by the Surgeon General, was responsible to the executive and legislative bodies in the same way as the Federal Reserve Board or the Controller General and the General Accounting Office?
The Surgeon General in this model would have the primary responsibility (1) to identify an epidemic as a substantial threat to public health; (2) to establish the necessary procedures to control the epidemic within the bounds of our legal safeguards; and (3) to have the power to marshal resources in terms of both personnel and money to control the epidemic. This change will require the availability of personnel not only for surveillance and laboratory support, such as the Centers for Disease Control, but also trained personnel to provide preventive, public health services. (4) The Surgeon General should coordinate the requests for further funds and their distribution in order to combat the epidemic. Such an approach does not weaken the role of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), for example, but instead would provide a more equitable distribution of funds to control the epidemic, including research in etiology, vaccine development, and drug therapy, as well as good public health preventive programs. It is unlikely that a drug-treatment program is going to have the same ability to obtain funds for control of IV drug abuse and transmission of HIV as a more sophisticated research unit at one of our universities. Clearly there is a need to coordinate services and research based on the need to control the epidemic. This task must be the primary responsibility of the head of a professional public health service. The implementation of such a plan would also require upgrading of the standards for public health practice at both the federal and state levels.
It is clear that neither the executive or the legislative branches of government can deal with the behavioral interventions and educational efforts that are necessary to control the current HIV epidemic by manipulating the system on almost a day-to-day basis [15] . Pouring more money into the AIDS program will not solve problems unless there is both a good organization and an adequate plan based on an understanding of the epidemic and methods of control.
